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Abstract
Deep neural networks have been widely deployed
in various machine learning tasks. However, re-
cent works have demonstrated that they are vul-
nerable to adversarial examples: carefully crafted
small perturbations to cause misclassification by
the network. In this work, we propose a novel
defense mechanism called Boundary Conditional
GAN to enhance the robustness of deep neural
networks against adversarial examples. Boundary
Conditional GAN, a modified version of Condi-
tional GAN, can generate boundary samples with
true labels near the decision boundary of a pre-
trained classifier. These boundary samples are fed
to the pre-trained classifier as data augmentation to
make the decision boundary more robust. We em-
pirically show that the model improved by our ap-
proach consistently defenses against various types
of adversarial attacks successfully. Further quanti-
tative investigations about the improvement of ro-
bustness and visualization of decision boundaries
are also provided to justify the effectiveness of our
strategy. This new defense mechanism that uses
boundary samples to enhance the robustness of net-
works opens up a new way to defense adversarial
attacks consistently.
1 Introduction
Due to the state-of-the-art performance of deep neu-
ral networks, more and more large neural networks are
widely adopted in real-world applications. However, recent
works [Szegedy et al., 2013; Goodfellow et al., 2014b] have
demonstrated that small perturbations are able to fool the net-
works in producing incorrect prediction by manipulating the
input maliciously. The corresponding manipulated samples
are called adversarial examples that pose a serious threat to
the success of deep learning in practice, especially in safety-
critical applications.
There exists two types of adversarial attacks proposed in
recent literature: white-box attacks and black-box attacks.
∗Corresponding author.
White-box attacks such as [Szegedy et al., 2013; Goodfellow
et al., 2014b; Carlini and Wagner, 2017; Akhtar and Mian,
2018] allow the attacker to have access to the target model, in-
cluding architectures and parameters, while under the black-
box attacks [Papernot et al., 2017], the attacker does not have
access to model parameters but can query the oracle, i.e., the
targeted DNN, for labels.
Correspondingly, a sizable body of defense strategies are
proposed to resist adversarial examples. These defense meth-
ods can be mainly categorized into three types:
Adversarial training/Robust optimization. FGSM adver-
sarial training [Szegedy et al., 2013; Goodfellow et al.,
2014b] augmented the training data of classifier with exist-
ing types of adversarial examples, usually referred to as first-
order adversary. However, some works [Papernot et al., 2017;
Trame`r et al., 2017; Na et al., 2017] showed that it is vulner-
able to the gradient masking problem. Madry et al. [2017]
studied the adversarial robustness through the lens of robust
optimization [Sinha et al., 2018] and further trained projected
gradient descent (PGD) adversary as a new form of adversar-
ial training. Note that all of these forms of adversarial train-
ing above rely on some specific types of attacks, thus show-
ing relatively good robustness only against the corresponding
attacks. However, they may not necessarily defense against
other types of attacks consistently.
Input transformation. Thermometer encoding [Buckman
et al., 2018] is a direct input transformation method, em-
ploying thermometer encoding to break the linear nature of
networks that is stated as the source of adversarial exam-
ples [Goodfellow et al., 2014b]. Defense-GAN [Samangouei
et al., 2018] trained a generative adversarial network (GAN)
as a denoiser to project samples onto the data manifold before
classifying them. Unfortunately, Athalye et al. [2018] found
that these methods including other input transformations [Ma
et al., 2018; Guo et al., 2017] suffered from obfuscated gra-
dient problem and can be circumvented by corresponding at-
tacks.
Distillation-type method. Defensive distillation [Papernot
et al., 2016] trained the classifier two rounds using a variant
of the distillation [Hinton et al., 2015] to learn a smoother
network. The approach reduces the model’s sensitivity to in-
put variations by decreasing the absolute value of model’s
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Jacobian matrix and makes it difficult for attackers gener-
ate adversarial examples. However, related work [Papernot
et al., 2017] showed that it fails to adequately protect against
black-box attacks transferred from other networks [Carlini
and Wagner, 2017].
To design an effective defense method that can be resistant
to various types of attacks, we propose a novel defense mech-
anism called Boundary Conditional GAN that can enhance
the robustness of deep neural networks by augmenting bound-
ary samples it generates; and demonstrate its effectiveness
against various types of attacks. We leverage the representa-
tive power of the state-of-the-art conditional GAN, Auxiliary
Classifier GAN [Odena et al., 2016] to generate conditional
samples. Our key idea is to modify the loss of conditional
GAN by additionally minimizing the Kullback-Leibler (KL)
divergence from the predictive distribution to the uniform dis-
tribution in order to generate conditional samples near the de-
cision boundary of a pre-trained classifier. These boundary
samples generated by the modified Conditional GAN are fed
to the pre-trained classifier to make the decision boundary
more robust. The crucial point why Boundary Conditional
GAN can help to consistently defense a wide range of attacks
rather than a specific type of attacks is that the boundary sam-
ples might represent almost all the potential directions of con-
structed adversarial examples.
We empirically show that the new robust model can resist
various types of adversarial examples and exhibits consistent
robustness to these attacks compared with FGSM, PGD ad-
versarial training, defensive distillation and Defense-GAN.
Furthermore, we quantify the enhancement of robustness on
MNIST, Fashion-MNIST and CIFAR10 datasets. Finally, we
visualize the change of decision boundaries to further demon-
strate the effectiveness of our approach. Boundary Condi-
tional GAN supplies us a new way to design a consistent de-
fense mechanism against both existing and future attacks.
2 Preliminaries
Before introducing our approach, we firstly present some pre-
liminary knowledge about different adversarial attacks em-
ployed in this work and necessary background information
about Conditional GANs.
2.1 Adversarial Attacks
Adversarial attacks aim to find a small perturbation η, usu-
ally constrained by l∞-norm, and then add the perturbation
to a legitimate input x ∈ Rn to craft adversarial examples
x˜ = x+ η that can fool the deep neural networks. In this pa-
per, we consider white-box attacks, where the adversary has
full access to the neural network classifier (architectures and
weights).
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM, Goodfellow et al.
[2014b]) is a simple but effective attack for an l∞-bounded
adversary and an adversarial example can be obtained by:
x˜ = x+  sign(∇xJ(x, y)), (1)
where x˜ denotes the adversarial example crafted from an
input x and  measures the magnitude of the perturbation.
J(x, y) denotes the loss function of the classifier given the in-
put x and its true label y, e.g., the cross entropy loss. FGSM
is widely used in attacks and design of defense mechanisms.
Projected Gradient Descent attack (PGD, Madry et al.
[2017]) is an iterative attack method and can be regarded as a
multi-step variant of FGSM:
xt+1 = projΩ(x
t + α sign(∇xJ(x, y))), (2)
where Ω=[0, 255]n
⋂ {x˜ | ‖x˜− x‖∞ ≤ } and α is the step
size. Madry et al. [2017] showed that (the l∞ version of)
PGD is equivalent to Basic Iterative Method (BIM), another
important iterative attacks. In this paper, we use PGD attack
to represent a variety of iterative attacks.
Carlini-Wagner (CW) attack [Carlini and Wagner, 2017] is
an effective optimization-based attack. In many cases, it can
reduce the classifier accuracy to almost zero. The perturba-
tion η is found by solving an optimization of the form:
min
η∈Rn
‖η‖p + c · f(x+ η)
s.t. x+ η ∈ [0, 1]n,
(3)
where ‖ · ‖p is the lp norm, f is the objective function that
is defined to drive the example x to be misclassified, e.g.,
f(x′) = (max
i 6=t
(F (x′)i)− F (x′)t)+ where t denotes a differ-
ent class and F is the classifier. c represents a suitably chosen
constant. Although various norms could be considered such
as the l0, l2, l∞ norms, we choose CW attack with l2-norm
due to the convenience of computation.
2.2 Conditional GANs
Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs, Goodfellow et
al. [2014a]) consist of two neural networks trained in oppo-
sition to one another. The generator G : Rk → Rn maps
a low-dimensional latent space to the high dimensional sam-
ple space of x. The discriminator D : Rn → [0, 1] is a binary
classifier, discriminating the real and fake inputs generated by
the generator G. The generator and discriminator are trained
in an alternating fashion to minimize the following min-max
loss:
min
G
max
D
Ex∼pdata(x)[logD(x)] + Ez∼pz(z)[log(1−D(G(z)))],
(4)
where z is the noise, usually following a simple distribution
p(z), such as Gaussion distribution. The objective functions
of discriminator D and generator G are as follows:
LD = Ex[logD(x)] + Ez[log(1−D(G(z)))],
LG = Ez[logD(G(z))].
(5)
Auxiliary Classifier GAN (ACGAN, Odena et al. [2016])
leverages both the noise z and the class label c to generate
each sample from the generator G, Xfake = G(c, z). The
discriminator gives a probability distribution P (S|X) over
sources, i.e., real or fake examples, and a probability P (C|X)
over the class labels respectively, P (S|X), P (C|X) =
D(X), where S denotes the sources and C denotes the
class labels. The objective function has two parts: the log-
likelihood LS of the correct source and the log-likelihood LC
of the correct class.
LS = Ex[logP (S = real|Xreal)]+
Ez[logP (S = fake|Xfake)],
LC = Ex[logP (C = c|Xreal)] + Ez[logP (C = c|Xfake)].
(6)
Figure 1: The effect of boundary samples against adversarial exam-
ples. The red point is a clean example x and yellow points represent
the existing adversarial examples. Green stars denote the boundary
samples generated by Boundary Conditional GAN. And the black
solid curves represent the decision boundary before and after con-
sidering the boundary examples.
D is trained to maximize LS +LC whileG is trained to max-
imize LC − LS . ACGAN learns a representation from z that
is independent of class label and we make a choice to use
ACGAN considering its state-of-the-art performance.
3 The Proposed Boundary Conditional GAN
In this section, we will elaborate our approach Boundary
Conditional GAN. First, we will detail our motivation why
we consider to use boundary samples to defense against ad-
versarial examples. Then, to verify that the proposed Bound-
ary Conditional GAN can generate boundary samples near
the decision boundary, we implement an experiment in a 2D
classification task, in which we visualize the decision bound-
ary and demonstrate that adding the Kullback-Leibler (KL)
penalty to the loss of conditional GAN can force the gener-
ated samples with labels to be near the decision boundary of
original classifier. Finally, we introduce the procedure how
to use Boundary conditional GAN to generate boundary sam-
ples to enhance the robustness of our pretrained classifier.
3.1 Motivation
From the perspective of attacks, the optimization-based ad-
versarial attacks, e.g., FGSM and PGD, solve the following
optimization problem to different extents so that they obtain
different approximations of the optimal adversarial attack.
min
η
‖η‖
s.t. F (x+ η) 6= F (x),
(7)
where F denotes the classifier. However, adversarial attacks
exist in many different directions around input x [Goodfel-
low et al., 2018] and the constructed attacks above only rep-
resent some potential directions of them, which also explains
why adversarial training based on these attacks has limited
defense power against other types of attacks. Considering a
clean example xwith a l∞ norm ball near the current decision
boundary represented by black solid curve in the left part of
Figure 1, we can observe that there exist adversarial exam-
ples, i.e., the coverage of yellow points, in some continuous
directions of an angle θ1 given the magnitude of perturba-
tion ‖η‖. Samples near the decision boundary, i.e., the green
stars, can represent almost all directions of adversarial exam-
ples, thereby it is natural to consider to use boundary sam-
ples to refine the decision boundary by data augmentation to
help the classifier defense against various types of adversar-
ial attacks. It is expected that the decision boundary could
be refined from left panel to right one in Figure 1 through
considering boundary samples, thus shrinking the coverage
of potential adversarial examples with an angle of direction
from θ1 to θ2. Consequently, the improved decision bound-
ary reduces the number of adversarial examples significantly.
From the perspective of defense, the consistent effective-
ness against a variety of attacks is of vital importance. Atha-
lye et al. [2018] pointed out that a strong defense should be
robust not only against existing attacks, but also against fu-
ture attacks. The key point of our motivation is that bound-
ary samples could represent almost all potential directions
of adversarial attacks and might exhibit consistent robustness
against various types of attacks, which takes both aspects of
attacks and defense into consideration.
3.2 Boundary Conditional GAN
It is highly intuitive that the predictive distribution by the
classifier for the samples near the decision boundary is close
to a uniform distribution due to the ambiguity which class the
boundary samples belong to. For example, in a classification
task with two groups, the classification probabilities of sam-
ples on the decision boundary is a vector [0.5, 0.5]. There-
fore, in order to facilitate the conditional GAN to generate
more samples near the decision boundary of original classi-
fier, we propose to add an additional penalty to force the pre-
dictive distribution of generated samples through the original
classifier to be a uniform distribution. The new generator G
loss [Lee et al., 2017] is as follows,
LGKL = LG︸︷︷︸
(a)
+βEPG(x)[KL(U(y)||Pθ(y|x))]︸ ︷︷ ︸
(b)
,
(8)
where LG is the original generator loss of conditional GAN
mentioned in (6) and (7), e.g., for ACGAN, LG = LC − LS .
θ are parameters of the original classifier rather than auxil-
iary classifier in ACGAN, which are fixed during the training
Figure 2: The generated boundary samples in different β from pro-
posed Conditional GAN. Red and blue points denote the data of dif-
ferent classes and yellow points represent the generated boundary
samples.
of the proposed Conditional GAN. U(·) is the uniform distri-
bution and β > 0 is a penalty parameter. The first term (a)
corresponds to the original conditional GAN loss since we
would like to guarantee that the generated samples are near
the original distribution of the corresponding class and not
too far from the data manifold. The KL divergence term (b)
forces the generator to generate samples whose predictive dis-
tribution through the original classifier is close to the uniform
one, i.e., samples near the decision boundary of the pretrained
classifier, by minimizing the KL loss while training.
To illustrate the effectiveness of the new GAN, we firstly
implement an experiment on the modified conditional GAN
in a 2D classification task; and show that the new GAN loss
can help the conditional GAN generate samples near the de-
cision boundary with corresponding labels. The training data
are simulated from two 2D Gaussian distributions in red and
blue respectively shown in Figure 2. For both the generator
and the discriminator, we use a fully-connected neural net-
work with 3 hidden layers. We visualize the decision bound-
ary and samples generated by the proposed boundary condi-
tional GAN in Figure 2. It shows that the new KL penalty can
indeed generate conditional samples in yellow near the deci-
sion boundary of original classifier. And generated samples
in yellow with different β are close to decision boundary to
different extents.
3.3 Defense Mechanism
In practice, we can easily access a pre-trained classifier for
a specified machine learning task and then design a defense
mechanism based on that. Due to the influence of the new
loss Eq. (8), there exists a slight decreasing of precision for
the obtained conditional GAN by directly training the mod-
ified conditional GAN from scratch. To overcome this is-
sue, we inject clean examples during the data augmentation
to maintain the accuracy of original classifier.
Here, we describe our procedure of defense mechanism as
follows and corresponding flow chart is shown in Figure 3.
1. Pre-train a classifier, i.e., the target model to defense, on
the specified dataset;
2. Train the modified conditional GAN with the new KL
loss; Eq. (8), forcing the conditional GAN to generate
boundary samples;
3. Feed the boundary samples with corresponding labels to
Figure 3: Flow chart of our defense mechanism against adversarial
examples.
the pre-trained classifier to refine the decision boundary
by data augmentation;
4. Evaluate the robustness of the final classifier against var-
ious types of adversarial attacks.
4 Experiments
In this section, in order to demonstrate the effectiveness by
our approach on improving the robustness of deep neural net-
works, we conduct experiments on MNIST, Fashion-MNIST
and CIFAR10 datasets from three aspects as follows.
Defense against adversarial attacks. We empirically
show that the new robust model by Boundary Conditional
GAN can resist various adversarial attacks, e.g., FGSM, PGD
and CW attacks. We compare the result with Defensive Dis-
tillation [Papernot et al., 2016], Defense-GAN [Samangouei
et al., 2018], a defense approach also based on GAN, and
FGSM adversarial training [Szegedy et al., 2013; Goodfel-
low et al., 2014b] and PGD adversarial training [Madry et al.,
2017] which are regarded as commonly accepted baselines of
defense. Consistent robustness can be observed through our
detailed analysis.
Quantitative analysis of robustness. To quantify the en-
hancement of robustness by our Boundary Conditional
GAN, we quantitatively evaluate the robustness on MNIST,
Fashion-MNIST and CIFAR10 and compare that with other
defensive approaches.
Visualization of decision boundaries. To verify the im-
provement on robustness of decision boundaries, we visualize
the change of decision boundaries around the input x.
4.1 Defense against Adversarial Attacks
We test the robustness of the original and improved classifier
by Boundary Conditional GAN against various attack strate-
gies compared with FGSM adversarial training [Szegedy et
al., 2013; Goodfellow et al., 2014b], PGD adversarial train-
ing [Madry et al., 2017], Defensive Distillation [Papernot et
al., 2016] and Defense-GAN [Samangouei et al., 2018].
Settings of various attack strategies. We present the ex-
perimental results by using three different strategies: FGSM,
PGD and CW. We perform FGSM with different magnitude 
and PGD attack for 40 iterations of projected GD on MNIST,
Fashion-MNIST and 8 iterations on CIFAR10. Next, we per-
form l2-norm CW attack with 1,000 test samples.
Settings of baselines. FGSM and PGD adversarial training
are trained with adversarial examples generated by standard
FGSM and PGD attacks mentioned above with different mag-
nitude. Defensive distillation is trained with soft labels under
Temperature T = 100, just the same as original paper [Pa-
pernot et al., 2016]. Defense-GAN, as another baseline, is
trained with WGAN [Arjovsky et al., 2017] first and has
L = 12000 at inference time on all datasets.
Settings of architectures of deep neural networks. The
classifier on MNIST and Fashion-MNIST has two convolu-
tional layers and one fully-connected layer. For CIFAR10,
we directly leverage ResNet18. Meanwhile, the architecture
of conditional GAN, i.e., ACGAN, is adopted by the original
one [Odena et al., 2016] so that the state-of-the-art perfor-
mance can be maintained.
We train ACGAN on the new GAN loss Eq. (8) on the
corresponding dataset to generate boundary samples and then
feed these boundary samples to refine the classifier by data
augmentation. Finally, we leverage the enhanced classifier to
test the effectiveness of robustness against various types of
adversarial attacks in Table 1.
Table 1: Classification accuracies (%) using different defense strate-
gies against various attacks on the MNIST, Fashion-MNIST and CI-
FAR10. “BCGAN” denotes the Boundary Conditional GAN and
“Adv.Tr” is adversarial training. Defense-GAN is with L=12000.
The number in bracket after FGSM is the perturbation magnitude .
MNIST
Defense Clean FGSM(0.2)
FGSM
(0.4) PGD
CW
l2
Original 99.2 74.5 31.3 11.0 32.6
FGSM Adv.Tr
(=0.2) 99.3 96.2 84.7 73.3 85.2
FGSM Adv.Tr
(=0.4) 98.8 96.3 92.3 44.5 96.3
PGD Adv.Tr 99.1 97.1 92.6 93.6 96.4
Distillation 96.9 96.0 96.0 96.0 2.1
Defense-GAN 90.1 83.1 71.2 77.0 34.4
BCGAN 97.7 97.4 97.3 97.4 97.5
Fashion-MNIST
Defense Clean FGSM(0.05)
FGSM
(0.15) PGD
CW
l2
Original 90.9 60.7 18.6 0.0 0.0
FGSM Adv.Tr
(=0.05) 90.3 81.1 58.5 2.0 54.4
FGSM Adv.Tr
(=0.15) 89.0 80.5 76.0 14.9 82.3
PGD Adv.Tr 83.5 81.5 77.7 67.3 84.9
Distillation 88.1 80.4 80.2 80.1 0.0
Defense-GAN 83.5 78.9 69.0 49.8 37.9
BCGAN 85.4 83.8 83.8 83.6 85.9
CIFAR10
Defense Clean FGSM(0.01)
FGSM
(0.03) PGD
CW
l2
Original 81.7 44.9 23.0 1.6 0.1
FGSM Adv.Tr
(=0.01) 81.0 67.9 46.1 25.4 6.3
FGSM Adv.Tr
(=0.03) 78.5 69.1 53.0 35.5 21.6
PGD Adv.Tr 76.2 68.3 54.3 38.9 34.4
Distillation 84.9 75.7 75.5 75.1 0.0
Defense-GAN 44.0 43.1 42.3 41.8 42.2
BCGAN 80.9 80.3 80.2 80.2 80.7
Table 1 shows the classification accuracies under differ-
ent defense strategies across various attacks on all the three
datasets. An important observation is that the Boundary
Conditional GAN significantly outperforms Defensive Dis-
tillation, Defense-GAN and FGSM, PGD adversarial train-
ing with different magnitude  against all attacks especially
on CIFAR10. Concretely speaking, adversarial training with
stronger attacks, e.g., larger  for FGSM or PGD, exhibits
better robustness but they more easily suffer from overfit-
ting to the crafted adversarial examples, showing a larger
drop on clean accuracy. However, these types of adversar-
ial training perform worse than other defensive methods on
larger datasets such as CIFAR10. In addition, Defensive Dis-
tillation is on par with the state-of-the-art performance of
BCGAN across gradient-based attacks but it fails to defense
stronger CW attack, which is also demonstrated in [Carlini
and Wagner, 2017]. We re-implement Defense-GAN based
on original paper [Samangouei et al., 2018] due to the dif-
ferent setting. However, the pratical difficulities especially
the choice of hyper-parameters of Defense-GAN, which is
also discussed in [Samangouei et al., 2018], hinder the effec-
tiveness of this method, resulting its limited defensive perfor-
mance especially on CIFAR10, in which the original paper
of Defense-GAN [Samangouei et al., 2018] has not provided
corresponding experimental result. For the Boundary Condi-
tional GAN, the consistent robustness of our method is easy
to observe although it slightly decreases the accuracy on clean
data due to the influence of limited accuracy of conditional
GAN, i.e., ACGAN.
4.2 Quantitative Analysis of Robustness
In order to further demonstrate the enhancement of robustness
against adversarial attacks, we quantitatively investigate the
enhancement of robustness.
We extend the measure of robustness [Papernot et al.,
2017] to the adversarial behavior of source-target class pair
misclassification within the context of classifiers built using
DNNs. The robustness of a trained DNN model F is:
ρadv(F ) = Eµ[∆adv(X,F )], (9)
where inputs X are drawn from data distribution µ, and
∆adv(X,F ) is defined to be the minimum perturbation re-
quired to misclassify sample x in each of the other classes.
We reformulate ∆adv(X,F ) for simplicity as follows:
∆adv(X,F ) = arg min
η
{‖η‖ : F (X + η) 6= F (X)}
(10)
Table 2: Enhancement of robustness by Boundary conditional GAN
in comparison between the original model and the robust model on
MNIST, Fashion-MNIST and CIFAR10. “Adv.Tr1” and “Adv.Tr2”
denotes adversarial training with different , which are the same as
the setting in Table 1.
Robustness MNIST F-MNIST CIFAR10
Original 0.40 0.15 0.16
FGSM Adv.Tr1 0.77 0.27 0.22
FGSM Adv.Tr2 0.86 0.47 0.33
PGD Adv.Tr 0.88 0.58 0.41
Distillation 1.67 1.65 1.84
Defense-GAN 0.10 0.11 0.12
BCGAN 1.94 1.70 2.00
MNIST Fashion-MNIST
Figure 4: Change of decision boundaries of original model and robust model by Boundary Conditional GAN on MNIST and Fashion-MNIST.
The higher the average minimum perturbation required to
misclassify a sample is, the more robust a DNN is against
adversarial examples. Then, we evaluate whether Boundary
Conditional GAN increases the robustness metric on the three
datasets. Unlike the original method [Papernot et al., 2017],
we do not approximate the metric but search all perturbations
for each sample x with certain precision.
As shown in Table 2, Boundary Conditional GAN signifi-
cantly improves the robustness of deep neural network on the
three datasets. More importantly, the enhancement of robust-
ness by Boundary Conditional GAN exceeds various types of
adversarial training and Defense-GAN dramatically, showing
the state-of-the-art performance. It is interesting to find that
the real robustness of Defense-GAN is poor and the underly-
ing reason might lie in the mode collapse problem mentioned
in the NIPS 2016 GAN tutorial [Goodfellow, 2016]. Modi-
fied conditional GAN applied in our approach might partially
avoid this problem due to the good property of conditional
GAN.
4.3 Visualization of Decision Boundaries
In this part, we visualize the effect of boundary samples by
comparing the change of decision boundary on two given di-
rections in Figure 4. We apply the visualization method pro-
posed by Wu et al. [2018], in which the two directions of axes
are chosen as follows.
Denoting the gradient g(x) := ∇xJ(x), the first direction
is selected as the locally averaged gradient,
G(x) = Eξ∼N (0,σ2)[g(x+ ξ)], (11)
where G denotes the smoothed gradient. The motivation
using this smoothed gradient is the shattered gradient phe-
nomenon studied in [Balduzzi et al., 2017], observing that the
gradient g(x) := ∇xJ(x) is very noisy; and one way to alle-
viate it is to smooth the landscape J , thereby yielding a more
informative direction than g. We choose σ = 1,m = 1000 and
the expectation in (11) is estimated by 1m
∑m
i=1 g(x+ ξi). As
shown in Figure 4, the horizontal axis represents the direction
of smoothed gradient G and the vertical axis denotes the or-
thogonal direction h := g − 〈g, Gˆ〉Gˆ. Each point in the 2-D
plane corresponds to an image perturbed by u and v along
each direction,
clip(x+ ugˆ + vhˆ, 0, 255),
where the origin x denotes the considered clean example, i.e.
the crossover point of the two dashed axes. The different col-
ors represent the different classes of the perturbed images in
the direction u and v. The left part of the subfigure for each
dataset depicts the decision boundary of the original model
around the clean image, while the right part denotes that of
the robust model achieved by Boundary Conditional GAN.
We visualize the improvement of decision boundaries on
MNIST and Fashion-MNIST. As shown on the left part for
MNIST in Figure 4, the region in blue above the central point
has been enlarged from the original model (left) to the robust
model (right), indicating that only larger perturbations could
attack the new model successfully. The similar situation can
also be observed on the right (Fashion-MNIST), where the
red region has been expanded around the decision boundary,
exhibiting the sufficient robustness of our approach. All of the
results in Figure 4 suggest that the robustness of the classifier
has been improved by Boundary Conditional GAN.
5 Discussions and Conclusion
Through our empirical observation, we found that the diver-
sity and accuracy of conditional GAN is of significant impor-
tance for our defense mechanism. The more diversity of the
generated samples by conditional GAN have, the more im-
provement of robustness can be observed. Furthermore, the
more accurate of conditional GAN is, the less decreasing ac-
curacy caused by misclassified samples generated by condi-
tional GAN can be obtained. Moreover, other strategies that
can generate samples near the decision boundary can also be
leveraged to design defense mechanisms.
In this work, we have proposed a novel defense mechanism
called Boundary Conditional GAN to enhance the robustness
of decision boundary against adversarial attacks. We lever-
age the modified Conditional GAN by additionally minimiz-
ing the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence from the predictive
distribution to the uniform distribution in order to generate
samples near the decision boundary of the pre-trained clas-
sifier. These boundary example might capture the different
directions of various adversarial attacks. Then we feed the
boundary samples to the pre-trained classifier to refine the
decision boundary. We empirically show that the new robust
model can be resistant to various types of adversarial attacks
and quantitatively evaluation on the enhancement of robust-
ness and visualization of the improvement of decision bound-
aries are also provided.
In summary, leveraging boundary samples by Boundary
Conditional GAN opens up a new way to design defense
mechanism against various types of adversarial examples
consistently in the future.
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